Eurocrisis and Monetary&Fiscal Policy

The government will have to borrow from overseas or International Monetary Funds to pay for the differences between the import spending and export costs. The European Union lend to Greece 109 billion of euros to bailout (Foreleg and Walker, 2011, July 23). This is really a burden for a country and it may bring negative effects to the government policy and function, because the government will have to response the imbalance in both the government spending and policies. It is a real social cost. Meanwhile, the confidences of the foreign will be effect. They may care about the external imbalance in their partner country because it is related to their profits and stability.The external imbalance may make investors feel risky and then reduce the investment or charge more on the loans, which will make the imbalance worse. And for the country, it is really a risk because the economic imbalance has negative influences on many different factors, such as the value of the currency and the natio nal credit rating. Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain (PASS) face the decreasing of value of their credit rating. Now Greece is C and Portugal is B+ (Hawkers, 2012, January 14). Both of them are not optimistic. When government face recession they will consider increase public expenditure and cutting taxes to stimulate demand and decrease the unemployment rate (Quailing, Eastward and Holmes, 2009).However, in this case, the crisis countries have so many debts that make their government deficit large enough to do no actions. What they have to do is to austerity their fiscal policy to reduce the deficit. So Greece executes the 5 years plan to get loans. Comparing to other European countries, PASS are relatively falling behind. Their economies are more relied on labor force type of industry such as globalization, companies are seeking for cheaper labor forces; their advantages are no longer existed. If these countries do not adjust their industry structure, they will e much frag ile than now during the financial crisis. Also, the labor forces among European Union are also not liquid.Companies from different country have different tax system so their funds become bubbles. The theory of optimum currency area is based on labor mobility, price and wage flexibility as the preconditions. Also the mobility can instead of the floating of exchange rate. Euro zone creates a system that labor can move freely, however, because of the culture, language, welfare and social norms, the labor forces inside European Union cannot achieve completely liquid Robinson, 2008). Monetary Policy The central bank of Europe has set several targets to help to achieve and maintain the macro economic objectives. The main target is to keep the prices stable and achieve the low inflation level in the medium term.And it also set targets of maintaining financial system stability and improves the payments system. The purpose that the central bank of Europe sets these targets is to achieve the economic objectives, promoting the healthy growth of the whole economy (Paula, 2009). And the most common and effective measure used by it is the monetary policy. The central bank helps to achieve the macroeconomic objectives through meeting its targets, with using the monetary policy. Using the monetary policy, the central bank can change the interest rate to adjust the aggregate demand, and then help to achieve the macroeconomic objectives. When the inflation occurs, the central bank will carry out the cash rate target, bringing up the official interest rate.And then, the central bank will sell the government securities to commercial banks. The interest rate for cash will be increased, because the decrease of the cash supply. In order to maintain heir profits, financial institutions charges more rates on loans and so does the deposits. Therefore, the households and firms will borrow less and prefer to save money in the banks rather than spend quickly. It means that the aggregate d emand is reduced and so does the inflationary pressure. The reduction of demand brings the prices down, so domestic produced goods will have advantage in the prices in the international market. More export earnings will be got and the external balance will be achieved.In addition, the low prices may attract more foreign investors to invest, which will benefit to the long term economic growth and full employment. It means that although the higher interest rate will reduce the production and make people lose their Jobs in the short term, it could bring chances for the future development. The similar theory is suitable for the opposite condition. When the aggregate demand needs to be pulled up, the central bank will decrease the interest rate and encourage economic activities, stimulating the growth of the economy so European Central Bank decreased interest rate in December 2011 by 0. 25% to increase aggregate demand (European Central Bank, 2012).Also, European Union has the same monet ary policy but without the same fiscal policy (Brittany, Timelier, Bergsten, Exchanging and Meltzer, 2010). Government financial policy serves internal to increase economic growth and decrease the unemployment rate. Indeed, these two on the allocation efficiency, currency policy serves external to keep low inflation rate and the stable currency exchange rate (Hudson and Quailing, 2009). Currency system and government financial system are not unedited so the coordination is difficult. When European Union was founded, they do not consider the quitting system, so hen there come problems, the costs of negotiations are very high (Repack, 2010). It leads the problems to the Euro crisis.When one or two membership countries have problems with their economics, they only can discuss inside the meetings to solve the problems. Then the market will face the strong fluctuations, and these fluctuations also make the problems unsolved. The banks among Euro zone have other European Union countries' debts. This makes European banks' credit expansion crazily, and the management risks increase fast. Their ratio of total capital and Tier 1 capital is even Geiger than the banks in supreme crisis in the USA (Beg, 2009). Conclusion Overall, although investors are losing confidence with euros, the monetary policy keeps the Euro price stability at an acceptable range. MIFF also lend huge amount of euros to save the market.

Getting Away with Torture

Global Governance 11 (2005), 389–406 REVIEW ESSAY Getting Away with Torture Kenneth Roth The Bush administration’s use of torture and inhumane treatment has undermined one of the most basic global standards governing how governments can treat people under their control. Contrary to the efforts of the administration to pass this abuse off as the spontaneous misconduct of a few low-level soldiers, ample evidence demonstrates that it reflects policy decisions taken at the highest levels of the U. S. government.Repairing the damage done to global standards will require acknowledging this policy role and launching a genuinely independent investigation to identify those responsible and hold them accountable. The creation of regulated exceptions to the absolute prohibition of torture and mistreatment, as suggested by several academics, will not redeem the tarnished reputation of the United States or restore the global standards that the Bush administration has so severely dama ged. KEYWORDS: torture, Abu Ghraib, Guatanamo, interrogation, cruel treatment.B’Tselem, â€Å"Legislation Allowing the Use of Physical Force and Mental Coercion in Interrogations by the General Security Service,† B’Tselem Position Paper, January 2000, 80 pp. Mark Danner, Torture and Truth: America, Abu Ghraib, and the War on Terror (New York: New York Review of Books, 2004), 592 pp. Alan M. Dershowitz, Why Terrorism Works: Understanding the Threat, Responding to the Challenge (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 288 pp. Karen J. Greenberg and Joshua L. Dratel, eds. , The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 1,284 pp. Philip B. Heymann and Juliette N.Kayyem, Preserving Security and Democratic Freedoms in the War on Terrorism (Cambridge: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 2004), 195 pp. Human Rights Watch, The Road to Abu Ghraib (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2004), 37 pp. Sanford Levinson, ed. , Torture: A Collection (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 328 pp. 389 390 Getting Away with Torture ho would have thought it still necessary to debate the merits of torture? Sure, there are always some governments that torture, but they do it clandestinely. Torture is inherently shameful—something that, if practiced, is done in the shadows.In the system of international human rights law and institutions that has been constructed since World War II, there is no more basic prohibition than the ban on torture. Even the right to life admits exceptions, such as the killing of combatants allowed in wartime. But torture is forbidden unconditionally, whether in time of peace or war, whether at the local police precinct or in the face of a major security threat. Yet, suddenly, following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, torture and related mistreatment have become serious policy options for the United States.Academics are proposing ways to regulate the pain that can be inflicted on suspects in detention. Overly clever U. S. government lawyers have tried to define away laws against torture. The Bush administration claims latitude to abuse detainees that its predecessors would never have dared to contemplate. Washington’s new willingness to contemplate torture is not just theoretical. The abuse of prisoners has flourished in the gulag of offshore detention centers that the Bush administration now maintains in Guantanamo, Iraq, Afghanistan, and the secret dungeons where the U. S. government’s â€Å"disappeared† prisoners are held.Hidden from public scrutiny, shielded from legal accountability, the interrogators in these facilities have been allowed to flout the most basic rules for the decent and humane treatment of detainees. Yet torture remains the despicable practice it has always been. It dehumanizes people by treating them as pawns to be manipulated through their pain. It harnesses the awesome power of the state and appl ies it to human beings at their most vulnerable. Breaching any restraint of reciprocity, it subjects the victim to abuse that the perpetrator would never himself want to suffer.Before looking at why Americans are suddenly confronting the torture option, it is useful to clarify what, exactly, torture is. The word torture has entered the vernacular to describe a host of irritants, but its formal meaning in international law is quite specific: the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, for whatever reason. Torture as defined in international law is not done by private actors but by government officials or those operating with their consent or acquiescence. 1 Torture exists on a continuum of mistreatment.Abuse just short of torture is known in international law as cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. The lines between these different degrees of mistreatment are W Kenneth Roth 391 not crystal clear—lesser forms are often gateways to tort ure—which is one reason why international law prohibits all such forms of coercion. 2 Torture as well as cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment is flatly prohibited by such treaties as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), and the Geneva Conventions.All of these treaties are widely ratified, including by the United States. None permits any exception to these prohibitions, even in time of war or a serious security threat. Indeed, these prohibitions are so fundamental that the Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, the most authoritative U. S. treatise on the matter, lists them as peremptory jus cogens norms, meaning they bind governments as a matter of customary international law, even in the absence of a treaty.Breach of these prohibitions gives rise to a crime of universal jurisdiction, allowing the perpetrator to be prosecut ed in any competent tribunal anywhere. Yet it is precisely because of the fundamental character of the prohibition of torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment that the Bush administration’s deliberate disregard for it is so damaging. If this basic human rights protection can be cast aside, no right is secure. Moreover, the Bush administration is not just any government. When most governments breach international human rights law, they commit a violation—the breach is condemned or prosecuted, but the rule remains firm.Yet when a government as dominant and influential as the United States openly defies that law and seeks to justify its defiance, it also undermines the law itself, and invites others to do the same. That shakes the very foundations of the international system for the protection of human rights that has been carefully constructed over the past sixty years. This unlawful conduct has also damaged Washington’s credibility as a proponent of hum an rights and a leader of the campaign against terrorism. The U. S. government’s record of promoting human rights has always been mixed.For every offender it berated for human rights transgressions, there was another whose abuses it ignored, excused, or even supported. Yet despite this inconsistency, the United States historically has played a key role in defending human rights. Its embrace of coercive interrogation—part of a broader betrayal of human rights principles in the name of combating terrorism—has significantly impaired its ability to mount that defense. As a result, governments facing human rights pressure from the United States now find it increasingly easy to turn the tables, to challenge Washington’s standing to uphold principles that it violates itself. 92 Getting Away with Torture Whether it is Egypt justifying torture by reference to U. S. practice, Malaysia defending administrative detention by invoking Guantanamo, Russia citing Abu Ghra ib to blame abuses in Chechnya solely on lowlevel soldiers, Nepal explaining a coup by reference to America’s postSeptember 11 excesses, or Cuba claiming the Bush administration had â€Å"no moral authority to accuse† it of human rights violations, repressive governments find it easier to deflect U. S. pressure because of Washington’s own sorry counterterrorism record on human rights.Indeed, when Human Rights Watch asked State Department officials to protest administrative detention in Malaysia and prolonged incommunicado detention in Uganda, they demurred, explaining, in the words of one, â€Å"With what we are doing in Guantanamo, we’re on thin ice to push this. †3 Washington’s loss of credibility has not been for lack of rhetorical support for concepts that are closely related to human rights, but the embrace of explicit human rights language seems to have been calculatedly rare.In his January 2005 inauguration speech, President Bush spok e extensively of his devotion to â€Å"freedom† and â€Å"liberty,† his opposition to â€Å"tyranny† and â€Å"terrorism,† but hardly at all about his commitment to human rights. 4 The distinction has enormous significance. It is one thing to pronounce oneself on the side of the â€Å"free,† quite another to be bound by the full array of human rights standards that are the foundation of freedom. It is one thing to declare oneself opposed to terrorism, quite another to embrace the body of international human rights and humanitarian law that enshrines the values rejecting terrorism.This linguistic sleight of hand—this refusal to accept the legal obligations embraced by rights-respecting states—has both reduced Washington’s credibility and facilitated its use of coercive interrogation. Because of this hypocrisy, many human rights defenders, particularly in the Middle East and North Africa, now cringe when the United States comes t o their defense. Reformers in the Middle East speak of â€Å"the hug of death†Ã¢â‚¬â€the ill effects of Washington’s hypocritical embrace.They may crave a powerful ally, but identifying too closely with a government that so brazenly ignores international law, whether in its own abuses or its alliance with other abusers, has become a sure route to disrepute. At a time when the Bush administration is extolling itself as a champion of reform in the Middle East, as the catalyst behind recent democratic developments, however modest, in Iraq, Lebanon, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the Palestinian territories, it is a sad irony that so few reformers welcome its support.That weakening of Washington’s moral authority in the Middle East is particularly tragic, because that region is where effective counterterrorism efforts are most needed. Open and responsive political systems Kenneth Roth 393 are the best way to encourage people to pursue their grievances peacefully. But whe n the most vocal governmental advocate of democracy deliberately violates human rights, it undermines democratically inclined reformers and strengthens the appeal of those who preach more radical visions. Instead, U. S. buses have provided a new rallying cry for terrorist recruiters, and the pictures from Abu Ghraib have become the recruiting posters for Terrorism, Inc. Many militants need no additional incentive to attack civilians, but if a weakened human rights culture eases even a few fence-sitters toward the path of violence, the consequences can be dire. Why is the United States taking this approach? To vent frustration, to exact revenge—possibly—but certainly not because torture and mistreatment are required for national security or protection.Respect for the Geneva Conventions does not preclude vigorously interrogating detainees about a limitless range of topics. The U. S. Army’s field manual on intelligence interrogation makes clear that coercion underm ines the quest for reliable information. 5 The U. S. military command in Iraq says that Iraqi detainees are providing more useful intelligence when they are not subjected to abuse. In the words of Craig Murray, the United Kingdom’s former ambassador to Uzbekistan, who was speaking of the UK’s reliance on torture-extracted testimony, â€Å"We are selling our souls for dross. 6 Moreover, coercive interrogation is making us less safe by effectively precluding criminal prosecution of its victims. Once a confession is coerced, it becomes extremely difficult to prove, as due process requires, that a subsequent prosecution of the suspect is free of the fruits of that coercion. As a result, the Bush administration finds itself holding some suspects who clearly have joined terrorist conspiracies and might have been criminally convicted and subjected to long prison terms, but against whom prosecution has become impossible. In February 2005, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) began openly fretting about the problem.What happens, it worried, when continuing to detain suspects without trial becomes politically untenable, but prosecuting them is legally impossible because of taint from coercive interrogation? 7 None of this is to say that the United States is the worst human rights abuser. There are many more serious contenders for that notorious title, including governments that torture more frequently and more ruthlessly. But the United States is certainly the most influential abuser, making its contribution to the degradation of human rights standards unique and the costs to global institutions for upholding human rights incalculable.It is not enough to argue, as its defenders do, that the Bush administration is well intentioned—that they are the â€Å"good guys,† in the 394 Getting Away with Torture words of the Wall Street Journal. 8 A society ordered on intentions rather than law is a lawless society. Nor does it excuse the administrati on’s human rights record, as its defenders have tried to do, to note that it removed two tyrannical governments—the Taliban in Afghanistan and the Ba’ath Party in Iraq. Attacks on repressive regimes cannot justify attacks on the body of principles that makes their repression illegal.So, how did we get here? How did the United States, historically perhaps the most vigorous governmental proponent of human rights, come to undermine through its own actions one of the most basic human rights there is? Several books, both new and old, provide insight into this sorry state of affairs. Cover-Up and Self-Investigation When the photos from Abu Ghraib became public, the Bush administration reacted like many abusive governments that are caught redhanded: it went into damage control mode. It agreed that the torture and abuse featured in the photographs were wrong but sought to minimize the problem.The abusers, it claimed, were a handful of errant soldiers, a few â€Å"bad a pples† at the bottom of the barrel. The problem, it argued, was contained, both geographically (one section of Abu Ghraib prison) and structurally (only low-level soldiers, not more senior commanders). The abuse photographed at Abu Ghraib and broadcast around the world, it maintained, had nothing to do with the decisions and policies of more senior officials. President Bush vowed that â€Å"wrongdoers will be brought to justice,†9 but as of March 2005, virtually all of those facing prosecution were of the rank of sergeant or below.To some extent, the sheer outrageousness of the sexual and physical depravity featured in the Abu Ghraib photographs made it easier for the administration to disown responsibility. Few believe that President Bush or his senior officials would have ordered, for example, Lyndie England to parade about a naked detainee on a leash. Yet behind this particular mistreatment was an atmosphere of abuse to which the Bush administration, at the highest l evels, did contribute. The ingredients of that atmosphere are described in several new books.The most comprehensive compilation of the documentary record is contained in The Torture Papers, a book edited by Karen Greenberg and Joshua Dratel, which includes all of the administration’s notorious â€Å"torture memos† available by late 2004. Mark Danner’s book, Torture and Truth, includes many of these same documents, as well as his insightful analysis, drawn from his articles in the New York Review of Kenneth Roth 395 Books, of the policy decisions that lay behind them. The Human Rights Watch report, The Road to Abu Ghraib,10 details how this atmosphere played out on he ground, as American interrogators deployed â€Å"stress and duress† interrogation techniques and then covered up the cruel and occasionally deadly consequences. Torture: A Collection, a new set of essays on torture edited by Sanford Levinson, contains thoughtful essays from a range of scholar s, including a vigorous debate about how to limit torture in the post-September 11 environment. The key to the administration’s strategy of damage control was a series of carefully limited investigations—at least ten so far.The reports of several of these are reprinted in the Greenberg and Dratel compilation. Most of the investigations, such as those conducted by Maj. Gen. George Fay and Lt. Gen. Anthony Jones, involved uniformed military officials examining the conduct of their subordinates; these officers lacked the authority to scrutinize senior Pentagon officials. Typical was the most recent investigation, conducted by Vice Admiral Albert T. Church III, who said he did not interview senior officials such as Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld or draw conclusions about their individual responsibility. 11The one investigation with the theoretical capacity to examine the conduct of Secretary Rumsfeld and his top aides—the inquiry led by former secretary of def ense James Schlesinger—was initiated by Rumsfeld himself and seemed to go out of its way to distance Rumsfeld from the problem. At the press conference releasing the investigative report, Schlesinger said that Rumsfeld’s resignation â€Å"would be a boon to all America’s enemies. † The Schlesinger investigation lacked the independence of, for example, the September 11 Commission, which was established with the active involvement of the U.S. Congress. 12 As for the CIA—the branch of the U. S. government believed to hold the most important terrorist suspects—it has apparently escaped scrutiny by anyone other than its own inspector general. Meanwhile, no one seems to be looking at the role of President Bush and other senior administration officials. As for criminal investigations, there has been none independent of the Bush administration. When an unidentified government official retaliated against a critic of the administration by revealing th at his wife was a CIA agent—a erious crime because it could endanger her—the administration agreed, under pressure, to appoint a special prosecutor who has been promised independence from administration direction. Yet the administration has refused to appoint a special prosecutor to determine whether senior officials authorized torture and other coercive interrogation—a far more serious and systematic offense. So far, prosecutors 396 Getting Away with Torture under the direction of the administration have focused only on the little guy. The Policies Behind Abu Ghraib What would a genuinely independent investigation find?It would reveal that the abusive interrogation seen at Abu Ghraib did not erupt spontaneously at the lowest levels of the military chain of command. It was not merely a â€Å"management† failure, as the Schlesinger investigation suggested. As shown in the collection of official documents organized by Greenberg and Dratel and Danner, Danner ’s analysis, and the Human Rights Watch study, these abuses were the direct product of an environment of lawlessness, an atmosphere created by policy decisions taken at the highest levels of the Bush administration, long before the start of the Iraq war.They reflect a determination to fight terrorism unconstrained by fundamental principles of international human rights and humanitarian law, despite commitments by the United States and governments around the world to respect those principles even in times of war and severe security threats. These policy decisions included: †¢ The decision not to grant the detainees in U. S. custody at Guantanamo their rights under the Geneva Conventions, even though the conventions apply to all people picked up on the battlefield of Afghanistan.Senior Bush officials vowed that all detainees would be treated â€Å"humanely,† but that vow seems never to have been seriously implemented and at times was qualified (and arguably eviscera ted) by a selfcreated exception for â€Å"military necessity. † Meanwhile, the effective shredding of the Geneva Conventions—and the corresponding sidestepping of the U. S. Army’s interrogation manual—sent U. S. interrogators the signal that, in the words of one leading counterterrorist official, â€Å"the gloves come off. †13 The decision not to clarify for nearly two years that, regardless of the applicability of the Geneva Conventions, all detainees in U. S. custody are protected by the parallel requirements of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention Against Torture. Even when, at the urging of human rights groups, the Pentagon’s general counsel belatedly reaffirmed, in June 2003, that CAT prohibited not only torture but also other forms of ill treatment, that announcement was communicated to interrogators, if at all, in a way that had no discernible impact on their behavior.Kenneth Roth 397 †¢ The decision to interpret the prohibition of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment narrowly, to permit certain forms of coercive interrogation—that is, certain efforts to ratchet up a suspect’s pain, suffering, and humiliation to make him talk. At the time of ratifying the ICCPR in 1992 and the CAT in 1994, the U. S. government said it would interpret this prohibition to mean the same thing as the requirements of the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U. S. Constitution.The clear intent was to require that if an interrogation technique would be unconstitutional if used in an American police station or jail, it would violate these treaties if used against suspects overseas. Yet U. S. interrogators under the Bush administration have routinely subjected overseas terrorist suspects to abusive techniques that would clearly have been prohibited if used in the United States. That the use of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment was intentional was suggested by Att orneyGeneral Alberto Gonzales during his confirmation process.In his written reply to Senate questions—after the administration had supposedly repudiated the worst aspects of its torture memos—he interpreted the U. S. reservation as permitting the use of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment so long as it was done against non-Americans outside the United States. 14 That makes the United States the only government in the world to claim openly as a matter of policy the power to use cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.Other governments obviously subject detainees to inhumane treatment or worse as a matter of clandestine policy, but the Bush administration is the only government to proclaim this policy publicly. Reflecting that policy, the Bush administration in late 2004 successfully stopped a congressional effort to proscribe the CIA’s use of torture and inhumane treatment in interrogation. †¢ The decision to hold some suspects—eleven known15 and r eportedly some three dozen—in unacknowledged incommunicado detention, beyond the reach of even the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).Many other suspects were apparently temporarily hidden from the ICRC. Victims of such â€Å"disappearances† are at the greatest risk of torture and other mistreatment. For example, U. S. forces continue to maintain closed detention sites in Afghanistan, where beatings, threats, and sexual humiliation are still reported. At least twenty-six prisoners have died in U. S. custody in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2002 in what army and navy investigators have concluded or suspect were acts of criminal homicide. 16 One of those deaths was as recently as September 2004. The refusal for over two years to prosecute U. S. soldiers implicated in the December 2002 deaths of two suspects in U. S. custody in Afghanistan—deaths ruled â€Å"homicides† by U. S. Army pathologists. 398 Getting Away with Torture Instead, the interroga tors were sent to Abu Ghraib, where some were allegedly involved in more abuse. †¢ The approval by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld of some interrogation methods for Guantanamo that violated, at the very least, the prohibition of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment and possibly the ban on torture.These techniques included placing detainees in painful stress positions, hooding them, stripping them of their clothes, and scaring them with guard dogs. That approval was later rescinded, but it contributed to the environment in which the legal obligations of the United States were seen as dispensable. †¢ The reported approval by an unidentified senior Bush administration official, and use, of â€Å"water boarding†Ã¢â‚¬â€known as the â€Å"submarine† in Latin America—a torture technique in which the victim is made to believe he will drown, and in practice sometimes does.Remarkably, Porter Goss, the CIA director, defended water boarding in March 2005 testimon y before the Senate as a â€Å"professional interrogation technique. †17 †¢ The sending of suspects to governments such as Syria, Uzbekistan, and Egypt that practice systematic torture. Sometimes diplomatic assurances have been sought that the suspects would not be mistreated, but if, as in these cases, the government receiving the suspect routinely flouts its legal obligation under the CAT, it is wrong to expect better compliance with the nonbinding word of a diplomat.The administration claimed that it monitored prisoners’ treatment, but a single prisoner, lacking the anonymity afforded by a larger group, would often be unable to report abuse for fear of reprisal. One U. S. official who visited foreign detention sites disparaged this charade: â€Å"They say they are not abusing them, and that satisfies the legal requirement, but we all know they do. †18 †¢ The decision (adopted by the Bush administration from its earliest days) to oppose and undermine the International Criminal Court (ICC), in part out of fear that it might compel the United States to prosecute U.S. personnel implicated in war crimes or other comparable offenses that the administration would prefer to ignore. The administration spoke in terms of the ICC infringing U. S. sovereignty, but since the ICC could not have jurisdiction over offenses committed by Americans in the United States without Washington’s consent, the sovereignty argument actually cuts the other way: it is a violation of the sovereignty of other governments on whose territory an atrocity might be committed not to be free to determine whether to prosecute the crime themselves or to send the matter to the ICC.The administration’s position on the ICC was thus reduced to an assertion of exceptionalism—a claim that no international enforcement regime should regulate U. S. criminality overseas. Kenneth Roth 399 That signaled the administration’s determination to protect U. S. personnel from external accountability for any serious human rights offense that it might authorize. Since, in the absence of a special prosecutor, the administration itself controlled the prospects for domestic criminal accountability, its position offered an effective promise of impunity. The decision by the Justice Department, the Defense Department, and the White House counsel to concoct dubious legal theories to justify torture, despite objections from the State Department and professional military attorneys. Under the direction of politically appointed lawyers, the administration offered such absurd interpretations of the law as the claim that coercion is not torture unless the pain caused is â€Å"equivalent to the pain that would be associated with serious physical injury so severe that death, organ failure, or permanent damage resulting in a loss of significant body function will likely result. Similarly, the administration claimed that President Bush has â€Å"command er-in-chief authority† to order torture—a theory under which Slobodan Milosevic and Saddam Hussein may as well be given the keys to their jail cells, since they too presumably would have had â€Å"commander-in-chief authority† to authorize the atrocities that they directed. The Justice Department, in a December 2004 memorandum modifying the definition of torture, chose not to repudiate the claim about commander-in-chief authority to order torture but instead stated that repudiation was unnecessary because, it said, the president opposes torture as a matter of policy.These policy decisions, taken not by low-level soldiers but by senior officials of the Bush administration, created an â€Å"anything goes† atmosphere, an environment in which the ends were assumed to justify the means. Sometimes the mistreatment of detainees was merely tolerated, but at other times it was actively encouraged or even ordered. In that environment, when the demand came from on hi gh for â€Å"actionable intelligence†Ã¢â‚¬â€intelligence that might help stem the steady stream of U. S. asualties at the hands of Iraqi insurgents—it was hardly surprising that interrogators saw no obstacle in the legal prohibition of torture and mistreatment. Nor did these basic human rights rules limit the broader effort to protect Americans from the post-September 11 risks of terrorism. To this day, the Bush administration has failed to repudiate many of these decisions. It continues to refuse to apply the Geneva Conventions to any of the more than 500 detainees held at Guantanamo (despite a U. S. court ruling rejecting its position) and to many others detained in Iraq and Afghanistan.It continues to â€Å"disappear† detainees, despite ample proof that these â€Å"ghost detainees† are extraordinarily vulnerable 400 Getting Away with Torture to torture. It continues to defend the practice of â€Å"rendering† suspects to governments that torture on the basis of unbelievable assurances and meaningless monitoring. It refuses to accept the duty never to use cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment anywhere. It continues its vendetta against the ICC. It has only selectively repudiated the many specious arguments for torture contained in the administration lawyers’ notorious â€Å"torture memos. And long after the abuses of Abu Ghraib became public—at least as late as June 2004—the Bush administration reportedly continued to subject Guantanamo detainees to beatings, prolonged isolation, sexual humiliation, extreme temperatures, and painful stress positioning, all practices that the ICRC reportedly called â€Å"tantamount to torture. †19 In selecting his cabinet for his second presidential term, President Bush seemed to rule out even informal accountability. Secretary of State Colin Powell, the cabinet official who most forcefully opposed the administration’s disavowal of the Geneva Conventions, left his post.Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, who ordered abusive interrogation techniques in violation of international law, stayed on. White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales, who sought production of the memos justifying torture and who wrote that the fight against terrorism renders â€Å"obsolete† and â€Å"quaint† the Geneva Conventions’ limitations on the interrogation and treatment of prisoners, was rewarded with appointment as attorney general. 20 As for the broader Bush administration, the November 2004 electoral victory seems to have reinforced its traditional disinclination to serious self-examination.It persists in its refusal to admit any policylevel misconduct in the treatment of detainees under interrogation. The Twisted Logic of Torture The Bush administration’s policy of abusive interrogation has received important support in the United States from three Harvard professors: Alan Dershowitz and Phil Heymann of Harvard Law School and Juliette Kayy em of Harvard’s Kennedy School. Rather than reinforce the absolute prohibitions of international law, each would seek to regulate exceptions to the prohibitions on mistreating detainees.Ostensibly their aim is to curtail that mistreatment but, by legitimizing it through regulation, they would have the opposite effect. Dershowitz, in his book Why Terrorism Works and in his chapter in the Levinson compilation, typifies this regulatory approach. In his view, torture is inevitable, so prohibiting it will only drive it underground, where low-level officials use it in their discretion. Instead, he would subject torture to judicial oversight by requiring investigators who want Kenneth Roth 401 to use it to seek the approval of a judge—to procure a torture warrant, much like they would seek a search warrant or an arrest warrant.This independent scrutiny, he posits, would reduce the incidence of torture. Dershowitz’s argument is built largely on faith that forcing tortur e into the open would reduce its use. But he simply assumes that judges would have a less permissive attitude toward torture than do the senior members of the Bush administration. The available evidence is not encouraging. Since torture would presumably be sought in connection with investigations into serious criminal or national security matters, the information behind the request for a torture warrant would presumably be secret.As in the case of a search warrant or a wiretap, that would mean an ex parte application to a judge, with no notice to the would-be victim of torture and no independent counsel opposing the request. How rigorous would judicial oversight be in such cases? We can derive some sense from the record of the courts used to approve foreign intelligence wiretaps, and the picture is not impressive. According to the Center for Democracy and Technology, between 1993 and 2003, courts operating under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) were asked to approve nearly 10,000 wiretaps of foreign sovereign agents.Of those, all but four were approved. When an intelligence agent claims that life-and-death matters of national security are at stake, there is no reason to believe that the scrutiny by Dershowitz’s torture courts would be any more rigorous. In the meantime, by signaling that torture is at least sometimes acceptable, Deshowitz would reduce the stigma associated with its use. Torture would no longer be a despicable practice never to be used, but merely one more tool in the law enforcement arsenal.Torture specialists eager to practice their trade would appear, international prohibitions of torture would be undermined, and America’s credibility as an opponent of torture would be deeply tarnished. Dershowitz points out that accepting clandestine torture also legitimizes it, but he seems never seriously to consider the alternative: vigorously trying to stop, and prosecute, anyone who breaches the absolute ban on torture. He ymann and Kayyem take a slightly different approach in their monograph, Preserving Security and Democratic Freedoms in the War on Terrorism. They foreswear torture but would allow a U. S. resident to order cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment so long as he or she certified to Congress that American lives were at stake. Again, the theory is that such treatment would be rare because the president would be reluctant to invoke that power. But since the president has already claimed â€Å"commander-in-chief authority† to order even torture, and since his attorney general claimed the power as recently as January 2005 to 402 Getting Away with Torture order cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment so long as it is used against non-Americans overseas,21 Heymann and Kayyem are probably overestimating presidential inhibitions.Making the defense against cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment depend on the man who has made such treatment a central part of U. S. counterterrorism strategy i s truly asking the fox to guard the chicken coop. Heymann and Kayyem take a similar regulatory approach to coercive interrogation short of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. The U. S. Army’s field manual on intelligence interrogation makes clear that coercive interrogation is unnecessary, unreliable, and wrong.That’s because, as most professional interrogators explain, coercive interrogation is far less likely to produce reliable information than the time-tested methods of careful questioning, probing, cross-checking, and gaining the confidence of the detainee. A person facing severe pain is likely to say whatever he thinks will stop the torture. But a skilled interrogator can often extract accurate information from the toughest suspect without resorting to coercion. Yet Heymann and Kayyem would abandon that bright-line rule and permit coercive interrogation so long as the president notifies Congress of the techniques to be used.However, setting American interroga tors free from the firm mooring of the U. S. Army field manual can be dangerous, as we have seen so painfully in Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. If mere coercion (itself a violation of the Geneva Conventions in wartime) does not work—and, given that the suspect is supposedly a hardened terrorist, often it will not—interrogators will be all too tempted to ratchet up the pain, suffering, and humiliation until the suspect cracks, regardless of the dubious reliability of information provided in such circumstances.In this way, coercion predictably gives way to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, which in turn gives rise to torture. The proposals from Dershowitz and Heymann and Kayyem suffer from the same fundamental defect: they seek to regulate the mistreatment of detainees rather than reinforce the prohibition against such abuse. In the end, any effort to regulate mistreatment ends up legitimizing it and inviting repetition. â€Å"Never† can not be redeemed if allowed to be read as â€Å"sometimes. † Regulation too easily becomes license.Behind the Dershowitz and Heymann and Kayyem proposals is some variation of the â€Å"ticking bomb† scenario, a situation in which interrogators are said to believe that a terrorist suspect in custody knows where a ticking bomb has been planted and must urgently force that information from him to save lives. Torture and inhumane treatment Kenneth Roth 403 may be wrong, those who talk of ticking bombs would concede, but the mass murder of a terrorist attack is worse, so in these supposedly rare situations, the lesser evil must be tolerated to prevent the greater one.The ticking bomb scenario makes for great philosophical discussion, but it rarely arises in real life, at least not in a way that avoids opening the door to pervasive torture. In fact, interrogators hardly ever learn that a suspect in custody knows of a particular, imminent terrorist bombing. Intelligence is rar ely if ever good enough to demonstrate a particular suspect’s knowledge of an imminent attack. Instead, interrogators tend to use circumstantial evidence to show such â€Å"knowledge,† such as someone’s association with or presumed membership in a terrorist group.Moreover, the ticking bomb scenario is a dangerously expansive metaphor capable of embracing anyone who might have knowledge not just of immediate attacks but also of attacks at unspecified future times. After all, why are the victims of only an imminent terrorist attack deserving of protection by torture and mistreatment? Why not also use such coercion to prevent a terrorist attack tomorrow or next week or next year? And once the taboo against torture and mistreatment is broken, why stop with the alleged terrorists themselves?Why not also torture and abuse their families or associates—or anyone who might provide lifesaving information? The slope is very slippery. Israel’s experience is in structive in showing how dangerously elastic the ticking bomb rationale can become, as described by the Israeli human rights group B’Tselem in its report on interrogations by Israel’s intelligence agency, the General Security Services (GSS). In 1987, an official government commission, headed by former Israeli Supreme Court president Moshe Landau, recommended authorizing the use of â€Å"moderate physical pressure† in ticking bomb situations.As B’Tselem describes, a practice initially justified as rare and exceptional, taken only when necessary to save lives, gradually became standard GSS procedure. Soon, some 80 to 90 percent of Palestinian security detainees were being tortured until 1999 when the Israeli Supreme Court curtailed the practice. Dershowitz cites the court’s belated intervention as validation of his theory that regulating torture is the best way to defeat it, but he never asks whether the severe victimization of so many Palestinians c ould have been avoided with a prohibitory approach from the start.Notably, Israel’s escalation in the use of torture took place even though a ministerial committee chaired by the prime minister was supervising interrogation practices—a regulatory procedure similar to the one proposed by Heymann and Kayyem. Indeed, in September 1994, following several suicide bombings, the ministerial committee 404 Getting Away with Torture even loosened the restrictions on interrogators by permitting â€Å"increased physical pressure. † Heymann and Kayyem never explain why, especially in light of the abysmal record of the Bush administration, we should expect any better from high-level U. S. officials.The Way Forward Faced with substantial evidence showing that the abuses at Abu Ghraib and elsewhere were caused in large part by official government policies, the Bush administration must reaffirm the importance of making human rights a guiding force for U. S. conduct, even in figh ting terrorism. That requires acknowledging and reversing the policy decisions behind the administration’s torture and mistreatment of detainees, holding accountable those responsible at all levels of government for this abuse (not just a bunch of privates and sergeants), and publicly committing to ending all forms of coercive interrogation.These steps are necessary to reaffirm the prohibition of torture and ill treatment, to redeem Washington’s voice as a credible proponent of human rights, and to restore the effectiveness of a U. S. -led campaign against terrorism. Yet all that is easier said than done. How can President Bush and the Republican-controlled U. S. Congress be convinced to establish a fully independent investigative commission—similar to the one created to examine the attacks of September 11, 2001—to determine what went wrong in the administration’s interrogation practices and to prescribe remedial steps?How can Attorney-General Gonz ales, who as White House counsel played a central role in formulating the administration’s interrogation policy, be persuaded to recognize his obvious conflict of interest and appoint a special prosecutor charged with investigating criminal misconduct independently of the Justice Department’s direction? These are not steps that the administration or its congressional allies will take willingly. Pressure will be needed. And that pressure cannot and should not come from only the usual suspects.The torture and abuse of prisoners is an affront to the most basic American values. It is antithetical to the core beliefs in the integrity of the individual on which the United States was founded. And it violates one of the most basic prohibitions of international law. This is not a partisan concern, not an issue limited to one part of the political spectrum. It is a matter that all Americans—and their friends around the world—should insist be meaningfully addressed and changed.It is an issue that should preoccupy governments, whether friend or foe, as well as such international organizations and actors as Kenneth Roth 405 the UN Commission on Human Rights, Human Rights Committee, High Commissioner on Human Rights, and Special Rapporteur on Torture. Taking on the world’s superpower is never easy, but it is essential if the basic architecture of international human rights law and institutions is not to be deeply compromised.As Secretary-General Kofi Annan told the March 2005 International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security: â€Å"Upholding human rights is not merely compatible with successful counter-terrorism strategy. It is an essential element. †22 There is no room for torture, even in fighting terrorism; it risks undermining the foundation on which all of our rights rest. Notes Kenneth Roth is executive director of Human Rights Watch. 1. See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Art. 1. . Ibid. , Art. 16. 3. See â€Å"Malaysia: P. M’s Visit Puts Spotlight on Detainee Abuse,† Human Rights Watch News, 19 July 2004, available online at http://hrw. org/english/ docs/2004/07/19/malays9097. htm. 4. Fifty-fifth Inaugural Ceremony, 20 January 2005; see www. whitehouse. gov/inaugural. 5. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 34-52 Intelligence Interrogation, Washington, D. C. , 28 September 1992, available online at http://atiam. train. army. mil/portal/atia/adlsc/view/public/302562-1/FM/3452/FM34_52. PDF. 6. ‘Torture Intelligence’ Criticized,† BBC News, 11 October 2004, available online at http://news. bbc. co. uk/1/hi/uk/3732488. stm. 7. Douglas Jehl, â€Å"C. I. A. Is Seen as Seeking New Role on Detainees,† New York Times, 16 February 2005. 8. â€Å"Red Double-Crossed Again,† Wall Street Journal, 2 December 2004. 9. Remarks by President Bush and His Majesty King Abdullah II of the Hashemite K ingdom of Jordan in a Press Availability, 6 May 2004, available online at www. whitehouse. gov/news/releases/2004/05/20040506-9. html. 10. Available online at http://www. rw. org/reports/2004/usa0604/. 11. Josh White and Bradley Graham, â€Å"Senators Question Absence of Blame in Abuse Report,† Washington Post, 11 March 2005. 12. The 9/11 Commission Report, see http://a257. g. akamaitech. net/7/257/ 2422/05aug20041050/www. gpoaccess. gov/911/pdf/fullreport. pdf. 13. Testimony of Cofer Black, former director of the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center, before a joint session of the Senate and House Intelligence Committees, 26 September 2002, available online at www. fas. org/irp/congress/ 2002_hr/092602black. tml. (â€Å"All I want to say is that there was ‘before’ 9/11 and ‘after’ 9/11. After 9/11 the gloves come off. †) 14. â€Å"A Degrading Policy,† Washington Post, 26 January 2005; â€Å"U. S. Justifying Abuse of Detainees,† H uman Rights Watch News, 25 January 2005. 406 Getting Away with Torture 15. Human Rights Watch, The United States’ â€Å"Disappeared†: The CIA’s Long-Term â€Å"Ghost Detainees† (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2004), available online at www. hrw. org/backgrounder/usa/us1004/index. htm. 16. Douglas Jehl and Eric Schmitt, â€Å"U. S.Military Says 26 Inmate Deaths May Be Homicide,† New York Times, 16 March 2005. 17. Douglas Jehl, â€Å"Questions Are Left by C. I. A. Chief on the Use of Torture,† New York Times, 18 March 2005. 18. Dana Priest, â€Å"CIA’s Assurances on Transferred Suspects Doubted,† Washington Post, 17 March 2005. 19. Neil A. Lewis, â€Å"Red Cross Finds Detainee Abuse in Guantanamo,† New York Times, 30 November 2004. 20. Memorandum to the President from Alberto R. Gonzales, 25 January 2002, available online at www. msnbc. msn. com/id/4999148/site/newsweek. â€Å"In my judgment, this new paradigm [the war aga inst terrorism] renders obsolete Geneva’s strict limitations on questioning of enemy prisoners and renders quaint some of its provisions requiring that captured enemy be afforded . . . [listed] privileges. †) 21. â€Å"A Degrading Policy† and â€Å"U. S. Justifying Abuse of Detainees. † 22. Keynote address to the Closing Plenary of the International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security, â€Å"A Global Strategy for Fighting Terrorism,† Madrid, Spain, 10 March 2005, available online at www. un. org/apps/sg/ sgstats. asp? nid=1345.

The role of operational management in the construction industry Essay

The role of operational management in the construction industry project - Essay Example The study provides an analysis of actions to be taken by strategic project management which can enable planning and completing construction process in time and within set cost targets. A brief conclusion is provided touching on key lessons that project management can learn from experiences in the project. Szkieletor also known as Skeletor is an incomplete building in Poland. It is located in the sides of Krakow near Rondo Mogilskie. The building stays incomplete in its construction since 1975. It is one of the tallest structures around and it was intended to be headquarters of the main Technical Organisation. The reasons for the incomplete building construction are a result of deterioration of the economy and high costs of construction materials. Szkieletor construction was intended to be made into an international four star luxury hotel, A-class offices, several commercial facilities and luxury apartments. Construction of Szkieletor was based on location of apartments in relation to targeted market. Luxurious apartments constructed were targeting individuals who were well off in terms of income and thus payment. The offices and commercial facilities were to be constructed for those in a position to acquire them since the city was growing up fast enough to demand the offices. The costs of the apartments were to be set as per the market price. The adjustments of the project were flexible enough to incorporate the ever adjusting activities during the construction process.... The offices and commercial facilities were to be constructed for those in a position to acquire them since the city was growing up fast enough to demand the offices. The costs of the apartments were to be set as per the market price. The adjustments of the project were flexible enough to incorporate the ever adjusting activities during the construction process. The cost budget was well set by qualified management team and construction process commenced. Several adjustments were made during the construction process so as objectives in the proposals would be met. The project management team selected to head and run the project was not qualified enough to address factors that would affect the project before commencing construction process. Lack of proper qualification may result into several inconveniences due to poor construction process and even failure of the project. The selected project management team should be made aware of the requirements of the project and the necessary resour ces availed to them. Duration that the construction process expected should also be conveyed out so that when construction strategies are being made time factor is kept in mind. Since the project management is the one supposed to control the project, it should be fit to undertake the given work. Where investment is involved there is an aspect of risk. If the risk is passed to a staff that cannot handle apartment construction then great losses are anticipated. It is required that the selection panel be careful to award the tender to the right team which will not cause defaults of the programs jeopardizing the whole project. Assessment of the extent of risk involved should be carefully done so that no mistakes are left out before the start

Free Market Vs Regulation Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 3000 words

Free Market Vs Regulation - Essay Example Government Role in Infrastructure: Infrastructure is a very vital cog of any country, and hence takes a supremely significant position in the government’s perception. Now, Rostow, who was a specialist in this field has made note and brought to light the fact that the inability of the governments to create infrastructure was one of the major road blocks that were faced during the process of modernization in Europe during the 19th century. In his argument, he says that the â€Å"creation of preconditions for take-off was largely a matter of building social overhead capital†. This comes in line with the generally accepted argument that the cost of infrastructure or the social overhead capital compliments the industrial production process as this facilitates the transfer of goods, which leads to the creation of mobilization of markets on a national and international level. Haber, another esteemed expert in this field, has further developed the importance of infrastructural support in his arguments based on the case study of Mexico. (Bracking, 2009) Here, he offers the opinion that Mexico was unable to solve the problem of surplus capacity which it was facing in the 1980s by exporting goods to different countries around the world. All of this, he attributes to the lack of infrastructural support that was present in the country at that point in time. He cites Avisador Comercial de Havana which attributes this problem related to the exorbitant costs of transportation: â€Å"How, then, can goods be shipped to the coastline at a beneficial value? How can they [Mexican manufacturers] compete in foreign markets†¦if within their own borders they have incredibly high freight rates?† (Geoffrey, 2002) In recent times, economic analysts have argued that the major difference between the growth differentials of different countries is infrastructure as highlighted by the case on India and China. Due to the importance infrastructure plays in the workings of a country and its non-excludable and unrivalled nature has further substantiated the claim for the need of governmental intervention to facilitate and hasten industrial growth in the country. On face value, one can see that this notion is somewhat not contestable in nature in that not many can refute the claim that has been put forward; however, some economists have also offered the notion of a private sector backed infrastructural growth. This notion certainly has immense promise in theory as this would basically remove the role of the government from this entire workup and would subsequently move the entire mechanisms onto a free market which would be highly appreciated in light of the concept at hand. However, that certainly does not appear to be a distinct possibility at the current point in time which is why infrastructural support has been ascribed to governments to this day and age. (Kiely, 2007) The rationale behind this is suggestions like the one offered are more likely to fail in the developing countries as private sector led infrastructural growth needs immensely advanced institutional or technological support in order to create and sustain excludable and rivaling properties.

Discuss the relevant advantages and disadvantages of quantitative and Essay

Discuss the relevant advantages and disadvantages of quantitative and qualitative methods in the context of real estate research - Essay Example Nowadays, independent research and innovative solutions are provided by a number of companies that have resulted in the noteworthy advancement of the real estate industry. Such companies provide independent fiduciary services, information related to investment opportunities, litigation, counseling, and research services that facilitate the real estate providers in various capacities. (Dalphin, pp. 16-19) In this sector of real estate research, it is very imperative that such companies may have access to detailed knowledge and data related to the trends of real estate industry, as it is very important that proper research should be carried out to provide investment opportunities to the clients. All these companies have to continue their research and keep it up to date, in order to survive in the real estate industry. In this regard, proper methodologies of research play an important and crucial role in acquiring proper information according to the requirements of the clients and customers. In this paper, some of the research methodologies will be described, discussed, and compared, in order to understand the effectiveness, strengths, and weaknesses of the techniques that will be helpful for the real estate industry in the future. In terms of definition, quantitative properties and their relationships are investigated scientifically in a systematic manner with the facilitation of quantitative methodology during a research project. In addition, mathematical models and hypotheses are developed and employed during the quantitative research. One of the concerns during the implementation of a quantitative methodology is that natural phenomena are considered during the employment of different hypotheses. Moreover, experiential and mathematical expressions are collected in a quantitative relationship through a fundamental connection of measurements. Both natural sciences and social

Inividual 4 Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1000 words

Inividual 4 - Essay Example Predicting the performance of different currencies in the market can help both individuals and investors in making sound business decision to minimize risk and maximize returns on investment (Oberlechner, 64). This paper focuses on a case studies related to exchange rate forecasting. A leader in a certain firm who has had keen interest on the exchange market and studied it predicts that in the next 12 months the exchange rate between the dollar and the Euro will be $1.41 to Euro. The company seeks to invest $ 500 000 in the forward, spot or options market. Using the current performance in the market, the forward rate is $1.37o5 to the Euro and the spot rate is $1.3435. This article discusses why the firm leader predicts that there will an increase in the exchange rate, seeks to calculate the profits that can be earned from the investment and gives recommendations on investments based on speculations. How to make Prediction on Future performance of the currencies in the exchange rate market One of the ways that can be used to predict future performance is by the use of Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). This is the most commonly used method and is based on the theory of one price where the prices of a identical commodities are assumed to have the same price in different countries. This means that if the rate of inflation in one country if higher than the rate of inflation in another country is lower, then the value of the currency with a higher rate of inflation will reduce in relation to the currency of the country with lower inflation. For instance, in this case study, the increase in value of euro could be as a result of increase in the rate of inflation in America in relation to inflation in the euro zone. For instance, if the predicted increase in inflation in America for the next 12 months is 5% and the expected increase in rate of inflation in the euro zone is 2% then the difference in inflation rates is the level of depreciation the American dollar currency suffers in relation to the dollar (Yu et al 245). 5%-2%= 3% difference in inflation rates. If currently the value of the euro is $1.5 then the new exchange rate will be: $1.5 ? 103%= $ 1.545 1 euro will exchange for $ 1.545. Another way the leader could have predicted an increase in the value of euro in relation to the dollar could be through the prediction of the relative economic growth rate. The value of a nation’s currency is expected to appreciate if the country has a good economic growth outlook with likelihood of greater domestic and foreign investment. American just experienced a government shutdown which is a phenomenon that is expected to influence investment negatively. Both foreign and domestic investors may not be willing to make huge investment under the unsure circumstances and this is expected to stunt economic growth rate (Yu et al 243). The euro zone is not experience anything like this and their economies are expected to continue growing. It is thus possibl e that the value of the euro will increase in relation to that of the dollar. Calculation of the Expected profits The spot rate is $ 1.3435 Forward rate $ 1.3705 $1.3705-$1.3435= $0.027 Percentage increase in rate: 0.027?1.3435? 100= 2.01% Expected profit $500 000? 2.01%=$ 10050 Recommendation on Investment Making investments in the speculative market brings about a lot of income within short period of time. It is also less involving as it does not require labor but being able to predict the market

Summary Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 500 words - 34

Summary - Essay Example They form part of the Secwepemec or the Shushwap nation and they total to 526 people. Just like other first nations, they too have undergone many injustices dating to the Indian Act Administration including abuse at school (p1). This group had come up with a Family Violence Program whose creation highlights the importance of community participation in combating crime. It further underpins the fact that government policies often act as barriers especially when they are misinterpreted and thus do not end up benefitting their people (p1). It has been noted that justice systems that the aborigines create and manage, serve as useful alternatives to the government’s criminal justice system (Casey 1991). Such alternatives include a wider absorption of aboriginal practices and traditions into the justice system or even creating an autonomous aboriginal justice system altogether (p1). Open-ended interviews were conducted among forty-one participants who were involved in the creation of the Family Violence program. To aid in this research, government support was enlisted in terms of research funds. Representatives of the government were also invited to sit in the community meetings and discussions. The government’s cooperation had to be fully sought (p3). Other departments not involved in criminal justice were also invited to participate in the aboriginal initiative. Departments such as Indian and Northern Affairs Canada gave funds, as did Health Canada under their corresponding sections pertaining to family and community affairs. The Aboriginal justice department was also invited to the meetings and even to participate in funding. However, the justice department refused to release funds (p4). Within the community, there were challenges encountered as well. Interviewees reported difficulties of opening up to others about their sexual abuse. Participants feared a lack of confidentiality owing to

Breast Cancer research paper Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1500 words

Breast Cancer research paper - Essay Example Breast cancers can develop in one or both breasts and are typically classified as either invasive or noninvasive. Non-invasive cancers are also known as in situ cancers because they are confined to a specific site in the body. Invasive cancers have the ability to spread throughout the body. Patients with breast cancer will typically come in for treatment complaining of increased breast pain, unusual lumps felt under the skin, and/or nipple discharge when not lactating. Although these symptoms are often caused by benign, or non-cancerous, processes, it is imperative that an accurate evaluation is made of the patient’s condition to rule out the possibility of cancer. â€Å"In one study, 16 percent of women between ages 40 and 69 came to the doctor with breast complaints over a 10-year period.† (Barton, 1999) It is for this reason that evaluation of breast complaints and screening for breast cancer account for a large proportion of the primary physician’s case load and will remain a significant part of the primary care practice. Although there are an estimated 190,000 women in the United States diagnosed with breast cancer every year, the number of women receiving screening mammography as recommended continues to vary between only 72 and 81 percent. These numbers reflect the number of insured women who receive the recommended care of receiving mammography screening between the ages of 50 and 64 at least every two years, more frequently when additional risk factors have been identified. It goes without saying that uninsured women receive less preventative care. Despite this, breast cancer mortality has declined gradually over the past decade to about 40,000 per year. (Bloom, et. al, 2000) ‘Screening’ is performed when there are no signs or symptoms of illness as a precautionary measure in women with high risk factors or women within the recommended age group. When symptoms are present, such as breast pain, lumps and nipple discharg e, evaluation procedures may require going a bit beyond the simple screening procedures. Even after a history of risk factors has been established and an examination focused on the specific complaint have been completed, ruling at most benign disorders as being the cause of complaint, treatment may still need to take place to remove the issues caused by the benignity. If cancer is suggested following these tests, discussions with the patient regarding diagnostic modalities – imaging, aspiration or biopsy – should be discussed during the office visit. Because breast cancer manifests itself in a variety of ways, differing in histologic, biologic and immunologic characteristics from patient to patient, this clinical evaluation may lead to referral of the patient to more advanced studies. As discussed in the previous section, breast masses can be placed into different categories, many of which are benign. Overall, cancerous lumps differ in many ways from benign lumps. They are much harder than benign masses; they are also fixed and stationary while benign lumps are more movable. Identifying of five risks through nursing assessment Although women with genetic dispositions for breast cancer are typically aware of the risks involved and strive to keep up to date with screening and regular

12 Angry Men Movie Analysis Essay Example for Free

12 Angry Men Movie Analysis Essay Introduction: This movie analysis will focus on the movie 12 Angry Men. There will be comparisons between the movie and the different negotiation tactics used in the movie and even in class. There were lessons learned from this movie and it gave new ways of thinking. This movie does a great job of using negotiation to win over a case when you are the odd man out. Summary: This movie focuses on a jury deliberating a first-degree murder charge on an eighteen year old boy. The boy is accused of stabbing his father to death. If found guilty of the charges, the eighteen year old boy will face the death sentence. There are many reasons as to why the boy looks guilty. He has a weak alibi, he claims to have lost the knife he bought, which was the same knife found at the murder scene, and there are witness’s saying they either saw the killing or saw the boy leaving the apartment. Out of the twelve jurors, eleven of them think the boy is guilty, except one. This is juror number eight. He claims he just does not know if the boy is guilty or not guilty, and wants to talk. The entire juror’s quickly begin naming all the reasons why the boy is guilty. For each reason, juror number eight questions each reasoning the other jurors bring up. He states a lot in the movie â€Å"is it possible?† This question starts to put doubt in the other juror’s minds about the boys’ guilt. Also with the ongoing deliberation, the jurors are starting to learn more about themselves and their personalities and this is causing them to vote â€Å"not guiltyâ€Å". Some realize they are prejudice or are holding grudges, or they are simply voting guilty because of their backgrounds. With each reason and deliberation, juror number eight continues to attempt to convince the other jurors that voting â€Å"not guilty† may not actually be correct. Juror eight is hesitant about sending a boy to die without talking about it first. He does think that from the trial the boy is guilty, but he’s just not too sure about it. He remains calm throughout the whole deliberation. The only time he shows signs of anger is when two other jury members start playing tic-tac-toe. This bothers him because everyone should be paying attention to what is going on and not playing games. He questions every incident with â€Å"Is it possible?† The best negotiators spend time asking questions, staying curious, and uncovering the other side’s views of the situation, facts, interests, and priorities. Throughout the deliberation, he uncovers information never presented at the trial, and helps the other jurors to think that it just may not be possible the boy could be guilty. Characters Personalities: Each character in the movie has a different personality about them which influences their decision on the verdict and they each express their own opinions based on their characteristics. Each juror plays a part in the movie where their personalities reflect back on a certain argument in the case. Juror one (Martin Balsam) is also known as the foreman of the group. He is put in charge to run the deliberation between all of the jurors. He likes that he has authority to run the group, but isn’t very assertive in doing so. Juror two (John Fiedler) is quiet and goes along with what everyone else says. He changes his vote early, though, to not guilty. He mentions about the height difference between the father and the boy, and how the boy would go about stabbing him. Juror three (Lee J. Cobb) is the angry member of the group. He is convinced the boy is guilty no matter what anyone says. He sees no point in discussing the boy’s innocence. There comes a time in the movie where he discusses that when his son was fifteen, he got in a fight with him and his son hit him. He hasn’t seen his son ever since. Juror three is angry with his son for his actions and for leaving, that he is taking out this anger on the boy in trial. Juror four (E.G. Marshall) is very convinced that the boy is guilty. He shows no sign of emotion and is able to recall much of what happened throughout the trial. He gets nervous though, as he cannot recall a certain movie he saw the other night, just as the boy could not do the same. Juror five (Jack Klugman) is a shy man. He lived in a slum all his life and can almost relate to the boy on trial, for he lives in a slum as well. He is an expert at using a switch knife, which comes in handy during the deliberation. Juror six (Edward Binns) is quite during the deliberation. He questions the boys’ motive for wanting to kill his father. Juror seven (Jack Warden) wants the deliberation to be over as quick as possible because he has tickets to a baseball game later that evening. He votes not guilty and does not wish to discuss why or why not. Juror eight (Henry Fonda) votes not guilty from the start of their meeting. He doesn’t know for sure if the boy is not guilty; he just wants to talk about it. He manages to cast reasonable doubt with the jurors on the boy’s innocence based on many aspects of the trial. He remains clam and patient throughout the deliberation. Juror nine (Joseph Sweeney) is an old man. He is the second person to vote not guilty, for he wants to hear more about the case. He is very observant, as he notices something about one of the witness’s during the trial. Juror ten (Ed Begley) is also an angry man. He is racist, and also very prejudice against people who come from a slum, which is why he believes the boy is guilty. Juror eleven (George Voskovec) takes the trial seriously. He stands up for what he believes in. He questions the boy’s actions a lot; such as if he really would have returned the his house three hours after the murder happened. Juror 12 (Robert Webber) is a smart man. He works for an advertising agency and has a hard time explaining his choice for changing his vote to not guilty. During the deliberation, certain parts of the character’s personalities play a part for different concepts. One example is with Juror five. During the trial, the boy was convicted of murdering is father using a switch knife as the weapon and stabbing his father down in the chest. Juror two makes a point on the height difference between the boy and his father, and how the boy would proceed to kill his father, meaning how he would have stabbed him. Juror five explains that he used to play with switch knives when he was around the boy’s age, and knows how to use one. During the trial, it was stated that the boy was an expert at using a switch knife. Juror five goes to demonstrate exactly how the boy would have pulled out the knife and stabbed his father: from underneath. He said it would take too much time to switch hands and stab down in his chest. Without Juror five having the knowledge and his personal characteristic of using a switch knife, the jury would have never learned how an experienced knife handler would have used the weapon. Tactics: In this section we will talk about a few of the tactics that we got the actors/characters using during the film. A few of this tactics were talked about during our class and case studies but some of the tactics were commonly used in everyday negotiations by everyone. We talked about power and how you could use power to get your way; you could use facts against the other party because facts are something you cannot ignore and emotions. Emotions are a hard tactic to master because you need to set aside your emotions so you can make a fair and honest judgment or answer. Power: Juror eight shows power over the other jurors. He has information the other jurors do not know about, and he is able to negotiate with them more. Information power is derived from the negotiator’s ability to assemble and organize facts and data to support his or her position, arguments, or desired outcomes. The other jurors only listened to what was presented in the trial. But Juror eight actually thought about the facts presented, and went out to look for more information. One way he did this was with the knife. The boy had bought the same knife used to kill his father the same night the murder happened. The boy claimed he had lost the knife, as it had fell through his pocket on his way to the movies. The owner of the shop where he had bought the knife claimed it was very unique, and he had never seen any other kind like it in his store. Juror eight asks to see the knife found at the crime scene. Everyone else is convinced this is the same knife the boy had bought, until Juror eight surprises them and pulls out the exact same knife. He says that he went out walking the previous night in the boy’s neighborhood and came across a shop just two blocks away from the boy’s house. He saw the same knife and bought it at a cheap cost. He proved to the other jurors that it is possible the boy could have dropped his knife, because that knife isn’t as unique as the thought. Another part where Juror eight has power is when they are debating about whether or not the old man heard the boy scream â€Å"I’m going to kill you!† According to the testimony, the boy had yelled those words right as the L-Train was passing by the window. Is it possible the old man heard the boy scream that? Juror eight stated that he had lived in an apartment next to the L tracks before and the sound of a train passing by is unbearable. Another juror said he had just finished painting one of the apartments and agreed that the sound is very loud. Juror eight had power over the others for he himself knew that the sound was very loud and it may not be possible the old man heard the boy say these things. Presentation of Facts: The way the facts were presented during the movie were all facts the jurors figured out themselves while deliberating, and not during the trial. There were many unanswered questions during the trial which caused Juror eight to question whether the boy was guilty or not. The defense attorney left out a lot of important information that was uncovered during the jury’s deliberation. One of these facts dealt with the old man who claimed he saw the boy running down the stairs from his apartment. The more the jury talked about the old man and what he said, the more Juror eight questioned if he had really seen the boy or not. One of the jurors pointed out that the man was dragging his left foot behind him, but trying to cover it up because he was ashamed. During the trial, the old man stated he heard a body hit the floor, and someone starting to run. He then said it took him no more than 15 seconds after he heard the body hit the floor to run out of his apartment and to the stairs to witness the boy running down them. Juror 8 thought then if it really could have taken him 15 seconds if he was dragging his left leg. This is when the jurors played out the scene to figure it out themselves. They were able to get a diagram of the apartment and measure out the dimensions of the room they were in. Juror eight walked the length of the room and back, while Juror two timed him. As he approached the end, Juror 2 said it took 41 seconds to walk the length they had measured out. By playing out the scene of the old man, this proved the fact it could not have taken the man 15 seconds, and he could not have seen the boy running down the stairs. Another important fact happened during the very end of the deliberation. At this point, everyone but two people believed the boy was innocent. Juror four says his reasoning for believing the boy is guilty is because of the woman across the street who claims she saw the murder herself. As he is talking, he takes his glasses off and begins rubbing the outside part of his nose where his glasses lay. Juror nine notices this, and asks him why he rubs his nose like that. Juror four says it is from his glasses, that they bother his nose, so he rubs him. Juror nine notices the markings on his nose from his glasses, and recalls the woman had the exact same markings on her face. He then asks Juror four if there is any other possible way to get those same markings on his nose, and he replies no. Juror eight then starts to say that the woman was lying, for she did not see the boy kill his father, for she was trying to fall asleep, and she wouldn’t be wearing her glasses to bed. These two examples show how hidden facts slowly come out. This is information left out from the trial that everyone missed, until now. After proving these statements, the jurors started to have doubt in their minds about the boy. It’s important to look at every aspect in as much detail as possible or you could miss out on something. Sure, the old man can say it took him 15 seconds, but as it turns out, it took him longer than that. And sure, the woman can say she saw the boy kill her father, but really all she saw was a blur, for she did not have her glasses on. You can’t always go by what you hear. You have to dig deeper to discover any hidden information that could help against your situation. This is what Juror eight did and it helped support his case. Also from these two examples, it goes to show that you can’t always believe what you hear. The witness’s both were under oath as they spoke in trial, but they could just be doing that for attention. Juror nine points this out for the old man, as he can relate. He is old and unnoticed. He just wants attention, so he could have made himself believe he saw the old man when he really didn’t. As for the woman and the glasses, she didn’t wear her glasses to the trial because she wanted to upgrade her appearance. So she said she saw the boy, seeing as if she didn’t wear glasses at all, but really she did for she had the markings on her nose. Emotions: Negotiations often evoke a variety of emotions, especially fear and anger. Emotions can cause intense and even irrational behavior, and can cause conflicts to escalate and negotiations to break down. Juror three from the start showed angry signs of emotion throughout the whole deliberation. He stated how he hadn’t seen his son in two years, and all his anger from his son is taken out on the boy on trial. Juror three wants everyone to agree with him. No matter what information is presented, he sticks with his vote of guilty. He gets mad whenever evidence is brought up or someone proves something wrong. His emotions reach a peak whenever Juror eight calls him a sadist. At this point, Juror three lunges toward Juror eight saying â€Å"I’ll kill him!† Then Juror eight replies, â€Å"You don’t really mean you’ll kill me, do you?† This proves his point about how sometimes people say things they really don’t mean. His emotions got the best of him, and he realized that he really wouldn’t kill the juror. Having your emotions from your personal life come into play during a negotiation is not always a good thing. Juror three should not have taken his anger out on the boy or even on Juror eight because of his son. He was angry at his son for leaving, but he should have put that aside for the deliberation. Having your emotions lay out like that on the table can cause you not to think about the important facts that need to be focused on. Juror eight shows emotion in a positive way. He stays very calm throughout the whole deliberation. By showing no sign of angry emotion, this allows him to keep his composure and control of what he is trying to get across. If negotiators feel positively attracted, they are more likely to feel confident and, as a result, to persist in trying to get their concerns and issues addressed in the negotiation and to achieve better outcomes Bias: I’d like to spend some time discussing an issue that I feel is very important to recognize when it comes to negotiations. This is the issue of bias. We had several discussions in class about bias. The thing that most fascinates me about the concept of bias, is that everyone tends to have a different opinion about it. It can be a very grey area, and many people have varying feelings on its presence and its effect on people’s behavior. Personally, I feel that it’s impossible to completely eliminate all bias from a situation. Even when looking at something objectively, bias still exists. It comes from personal characteristics, experiences, and opinions. This movie does a great job of showing how bias can have an effect on negotiations. I’d like to cite an example from the film regarding juror number ten. This juror is an old man who is very set in his ways. He is among the eleven jurors who found the boy guilty of murder. However, his reason for voting guilty comes from a very different place than the others. The evidence seems to favor a guilty vote, but the film shows us that this gentleman’s vote was sealed the minute he learned the boy was from a slum. During the deliberations, this juror seconds an argument made by a fellow juror. He says, â€Å"Brother, you can say that again. The kids who crawl out of these places are real trash.† Regardless of this evidence, this shows a bias against the boy from the start. This man is allowing his prejudice against â€Å"slum dwellers† to influence his decision about the verdict. The juror across the table then takes offense to this comment. â€Å"I’ve lived in a slum all my life,† says the juror. This should quell the old man’s argument, but it doesn’t. He still feels strongly about his position, even though a man from a similar background clearly hasn’t followed a path that â€Å"trash† might follow. This demonstrates the power of bias. The greatest example of overcoming bias in this film occurs in the very last minutes. By this point, the jury has reached a vote of 11 to 1 for â€Å"not guilty.† The lone juror who still maintains the boy’s guilt is juror number three. This is the man who hasn’t seen his own son in over two years. Earlier in the deliberations, he explained how he and his son got into a fight when the boy was still a teenager. His son hit him, and things were never the same between them. As the talks between the jurors continues, it becomes more and more evident that this man has a bias against the boy on trial because of what transpired with his own boy. He wants to see this boy killed because he resents his own son for what occurred between them. The initial juror who voted â€Å"not guilty† went as far as calling him a â€Å"sadist† and a â€Å"public avenger.† In the final scene, that juror asks the man to defend his arguments one last time. There is a re asonable doubt in the minds of eleven jurors, and he wants to know why there isn’t one in his. Juror number three begins explaining, yelling the entire time. You can see him getting more and more upset as he continues to pour over evidence that the other men have already proven shaky. Finally, he rips up the picture of him and his son that has slid out of his wallet on the table. He then bursts into tears and cries, â€Å"Not guilty, not guilty.† It was clearly painful for him to confront what happened with his son head on like that. This was creating his bias the entire time. When the evidence appeared to support the boy’s guilt, his bias was less prevalent. But when the evidence that started out convincing ended up being questionable, his bias began to show. He still wanted the boy to be found guilty because of it. This really makes you wonder how often this occurs in the real world. How many innocent men and women have been sent to jail because of biased members of a perceived â€Å"impartial† jury? It’s an imperfect system, dealing with a very i nexact science. Recognizing this is very important. From this course, and from analyzing this film, I have strengthened my belief that bias can’t be eliminated. All a negotiator can do is recognize that bias is constant, and do their best to minimize its effect on their decision making process. If a negotiator recognizes this, they can do more negotiating based on facts and figures rather than personal biases and opinions. Power and Persuasion: An interesting aspect of this movie, as it continues to relate to this course, is the use of power and persuasion. What I find most interesting about power, is the myriad of ways through which it may be obtained. In class, we discussed several ways that power is obtained, and also how it can be used. In this movie, there are many circumstances where the jurors attempt to use power to persuade one another. Perhaps the most prevalent example at an attempt to use power to persuade the others is shown by juror number three. This juror often exudes power when talking down the case with the man who hasn’t turned in a â€Å"guilty† verdict. He begins by explaining all of the evidence again. He discusses the old man who claims he heard the boy, the old lady who says she saw the boy, and the knife discovered by the police who arrived at the murder scene. He is very confident in this evidence, and feels as though he has the power because of it. After taking this course, I find that this is the best way to gain power in a negotiation. The more information you have to support your argument, the more power you have. In turn, this often results in achieving your goals in the negotiation. However, as the process continues, the juror voting â€Å"not guilty† starts to sway the room. The oldest man on the jury is the first to change his vote. The juror from the slums changes his vote not long after that. As this is happening, it appears that juror number three feels as though he is losing power in this negotiation. To counter this, he begins raising his voice when talks. Before long, he is all but yelling at the other jurors who have changed their votes. He attempts to retain his power through intimidation once he sees that the evidence, which he thought was solid, is shown to be shaky and imprecise. Another example of how power is used to persuade others in this film is demonstrated by the stock broker, otherwise known as juror number four. It appears that this juror feels an immediate sense of power in this scenario because he is one of the most, if not the most, accomplished gentleman of the group. He feels that he is probably the most intelligent man on this jury, and demonstrates that when talks. He recalls much of the information from the trial very accurately, and with no notes. He also explains very clearly why he feels the way he feels. Power through intellectual superiority can be very persuasive, and influential. The man he is attempting to persuade does a very good job of keeping his composure. He doesn’t challenge the broker’s power. In fact, he affirms it. He appears to respect that the juror is making valid points and supporting his argument. He goes a different route. He simply takes an issue and asks, â€Å"Is it possible?† While the other jurors refute this claim, the broker remains quiet. As the man slowly begins to disprove some of the testimony from the case, you can see the broker questioning his verdict more intently. Finally, he changes his vote to not guilty. This is where everything turns. The other jurors picked up on the quiet power exuded by the broker, and respected it all along. Once he turned in a â€Å"not guilty† vote, it was only a matter of time before the others joined him. This is convincing tell that this man had a great deal of power in this negotiation. In a less successful attempt to gain power, the angry old man attempts to convince the man of the boy’s guilt through a â€Å"power in numbers† technique. He feels very comfortable with his verdict of â€Å"guilty† because the others feel the same way. During the initial discussions in the deliberation room, he continuously says, â€Å"You know what I mean?† This is an attempt to keep others on his side while he tries to persuade the rogue juror to vote â€Å"guilty.† He feels he has power in this negotiation because he has the majority on his side. This is a common tactic in negotiations. As the film progresses and more and more jurors change their verdict, you can easily see the power leaving the angry old man. He is forced to confront his prejudice and accept that he was wrong. When he is no longer in the majority, his sense of power quickly fades. He becomes defensive and weak as more and more people leave his side. This is most prevalent in the scene where he attempts to defend his â€Å"guilty† vote one last time. He stands up, and continues yelling and shouting his narrow minded opinions, much as he’d done the entire time. His arguments, now more than ever, are being entirely disregarded, and for good reason. Each point he is making is based solely on prejudice. He thinks he is powerful, but nothing he is saying is based on fact, or really has anything to do with the case. One by one, the other jurors begin getting up from the table and ignoring him. Even the juror who was consistently making wise cracks during the deliberations is looking away from him. Soon, no one in the room is backing him. He then retires to the corner, alone. He not only lost the majority, he lost the support of the other men who were still turning in a â€Å"guilty† vote. This is a great example of power shifting, which we discussed in class. You asked us if it’s possible for power to shift during a negotiation, and this is a good demonstration of how it can. Works Cited: Ang, S., Van Dyne, L., Koh, C.K.S. (2006). Personality correlates of the four factor model of cultural intelligence. Group and Organization Management, 31, 100-123. Diamond, S. (2010). Getting More: How to Negotiate to Achieve Your Goals in the Real World. New York City, NY: Crown Publishing Group. Earley, P.C., Ang, S. (2003). Cultural intelligence: Individual interactions across cultures. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press. Gates, S. (2011). The Negotiation Book: Your Definitive Guide To Successful Negotiating (1st ed.). United Kingdom, UK: John Wiley and Sons LTD. Shell , R. G. (2006). Bargaining for Advantage: Negotiation Strategies for Reasonable People 2nd Edition (2nd ed.). New York City, NY: The Penguin Group. Thompson, L. L. (2008). The Truth About Negotiations . Upper Saddle River, NJ: FT Press.